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The U.S. dairy industry was a bit player in dairy exporting and foreign direct investment in dairy-food busi-
nesses during much of the 1990s and early 2000s. But U.S. dairy companies became more important exporters 
beginning in the mid-2000s when international and domestic developments changed the economic environment 
facing the U.S. dairy industry. Globalization trends—which previously had little effect on the U.S. dairy indus-
try—created important opportunities for expanded dairy exports in the mid-2000s. Global and domestic develop-
ments that expanded opportunities for U.S. dairy exports include the fall in the value of the U.S. dollar, a decline 
in European Union (EU) dairy exports, production shortfalls in other major dairy exporting countries, the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and declining real government support for segments of the U.S. dairy 
industry. 
U.S. dairy exports during the next several years will be shaped in important ways by the following develop-
ments: 
•  Reduced USDA support prices for nonfat dry milk (NDM) and production shortfalls in other exporting 
countries will help to maintain relatively large U.S. exports of that product. U.S. whey exports also will 
continue to be robust because of the host of uses for whey products, substitution of whey for NDM by 
foreign processors, and the absence of USDA supports that price U.S. whey products out of international 
markets.
•  While U.S. butter exports increased in 2007, it is questionable whether U.S. bulk butter can remain price 
competitive in international markets over the longer-run. 
•  Prospects for U.S. cheese exports are difﬁcult to assess partly because of the heterogeneity of cheese 
products. However, Mexico is likely to remain a strong market for U.S. cheese, partly because of the 
preferred access that the U.S. gained to the Mexican market under the NAFTA. The U.S. cheese industry also 
will have opportunities to gain a larger share of the multibillion dollar U.S. specialty cheese business if, as 
expected, the industry displaces additional imports of European specialty cheeses. 
•  U.S. dairy exporters have a window of opportunity for expanding dairy exports during 2008 to 2014/15 while 
EU milk production quotas remain in effect. If, as is likely, EU milk production quotas end after 2014/2015, 
European ﬁrms will beneﬁt from the removal of quota shackles and become stronger competitors in world 
dairy markets. 
Five U.S. ﬁrms—Dean Foods, Kraft Foods, Schreiber Foods, Dairy Farmers of America and Land OʼLakes—
are members of the top twenty dairy companies in the world in terms of value of dairy sales. Strategies of the top 
ﬁve U.S. ﬁrms, which will inﬂuence the size of the U.S. dairy industryʼs dairy exports and foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI) in dairy-food businesses, include the following:
•  Dean Foods is focusing increasingly on the domestic market for ﬂuid milk products. This strategy manifested 
itself in the ﬁrmʼs decision to divest itself of its operations in Spain and Portugal in 2006 and 2007.
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•  Kraft Foods has recently focused its expansion efforts in foreign dairy-foods businesses in growth markets 
where the ﬁrm has sufﬁcient scale, including Mexico and Brazil. However, the ﬁrmʼs big foreign acquisition 
in 2007 was the purchase of Groupe Danoneʼs biscuit (cookie) business for $7.2 billion. 
•  Dairy Farmers of America (DFA) has entered into joint ventures and alliances with Fonterra of New Zealand 
and Glanbia of Ireland. These initiatives increase DFAʼs ability to engage in import substitution and give the 
cooperative additional experience with global dairy markets. DFA also has become an important exporter of 
whey products. However, DFAʼs participation in the Dairy America initiative to outsource NDM exports to 
Fonterra denies the ﬁrm of valuable exporting experience for an important export item.
•  Land OʼLakes is focusing increasingly on expanding domestic sales of value-added dairy products. This 
strategy manifested prominently in the cooperativeʼs sale of its Cheese & Protein International plant 
(industrial cheese plant) in Tulare, California to a U.S. subsidiary of Canada-based Saputo, Inc. in 2007. 
•  While DFA and Land OʼLakes have a strong domestic focus to their businesses, both are positioned 
strategically to expand dairy exports and dairy FDI fairly rapidly if proﬁt prospects dictate the need for such 
a change. 
•  Schreiber Foods is a rapidly growing cheese company that is likely to be a noteworthy actor in expanding 
U.S. dairy exports and dairy FDI in future years. The ﬁrmʼs recent foreign acquisitions include a 51 percent 
share of Dynamix Dairy Industries, Ltd. in India. 
For the next several years, U.S. companies are likely to make limited amounts of FDI in dairy-food businesses. 
Consequently, investments by foreign ﬁrms in the U.S. dairy sector will continue to exceed similar U.S. invest-
ments abroad for the foreseeable future. Foreign investors (including Nestle, Unilever, Danone, Fonterra and Glan-
bia) in U.S. dairy businesses have brought important technologies and expertise to the U.S. dairy industry.
Part of the reason for the low prospective U.S. FDI is the decline in the value of the U.S. dollar. U.S. FDI in the 
dairy-food businesses in Mexico may be attractive partly because the dollar has held up well against the Mexican 
peso. But dairy exports—which are helped by the weak U.S. dollar—rather than FDI will be the main vehicle 
through which the U.S. dairy industry will increase its footprint in world dairy markets in the next few years.Babcock Institute Discussion Paper No. 2008-1  3
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Focus of the Paper
For the ﬁrst several decades after WW II, the U.S. 
dairy industry focused heavily on serving the domes-
tic market. The reasons for this emphasis are easy to 
fathom. The U.S. dairy market is large, familiar, and 
populated by many high-income consumers, making it 
an attractive market to serve. In addition, the U.S. gov-
ernment provided a ready market for dairy surpluses 
under the USDAʼs dairy price support program during 
this period. 
But in the 1990s, dairy industry ofﬁcials familiar 
with strategies of dairy companies in export-oriented 
countries urged the U.S. dairy industry to give more 
attention to export markets. Among the ﬁrst to call for 
a greater focus on exports was Mr. Bruce Stuart, for-
mer CEO of M.E. Franks (a leading exporter of U.S. 
dairy products in the 1990s) and a former ofﬁcial of 
the New Zealand Dairy Board (now part of Fonterra). 
Stuart said this about the U.S. dairy industry in 1992 
[30]:
The (U.S.) dairy industry should also keep in mind 
the fact that one of these days we may be without 
government assistance, but still in need of the sec-
ondary international market. The more experience 
and presence we can gain now in markets across 
the ocean, the better prepared we will be for the 
challenge such a situation would bring.
Stuartʼs comment may have reﬂected the New Zea-
land  Dairy  Boardʼs  (NZDB)  experience  with  early 
mover advantages in dairy exporting. For example, Mr. 
Neville Martin, a NZDB ofﬁcial reported in 1995 that, 
based on the Boardʼs international experience, initial 
entrants into a market gain, on average, a 15 percent 
advantage over second entrants. Third-place entrants 
into a given market tend to break even. Entering a 
market fourth or later is a strategy for losing money 
[23]. While early mover advantages probably cannot 
be deﬁned as precisely as Martin suggests, it is likely 
that those advantages are substantial. 
Mr.  Thomas  Suber,  then  Executive  Director  of 
the U.S. Dairy Export Council (USDEC), character-
ized the future of the U.S. dairy industry in 1999 as 
one where real costs of milk production are declining, 
domestic demand is growing modestly, and the role of 
government is declining. As a result, he claimed that 
“. . . the processors, cooperatives, traders, and farmers 
who determine USDEC policy face the future with a 
cold realism that either we compete internationally or 
we shrink as an industry [31].” 
Exhortations of the type delivered by Stuart and 
Suber and any fear on the part of the U.S. dairy indus-
try  of  suffering  the  disadvantages  associated  with 
being a late mover into dairy exporting had little effect 
on U.S. dairy exports for much of the 1990s and early 
2000s. However, U.S. dairy exports during the early 
1990s  did  exhibit  some  strength  because  of  fairly 
large foreign sales of nonfat dry milk (NDM) and but-
ter, made mostly with the help of U.S. Dairy Export 
Incentive Program (DEIP) subsidies (Table 1). Indeed, 
in 1993 the U.S. recorded a small dairy trade surplus 
(Figure 1). However, after 1993 the U.S. ran a long 
string of large dairy trade deﬁcits. The U.S. also con-
tinued to be an important destination for foreign direct 
investment (FDI) in dairy-food businesses. 
However, in recent years the U.S. has become a 
bigger  player  in  dairy  exporting.  NDM,  whey  and 
whey products, and cheese have become the biggest 
U.S. dairy export items [16]. In 2006, for example, 
these products accounted for 63 percent of the value 
of U.S. dairy exports. Mexico and Canada were the 
most  important  destination  markets  for  U.S.  dairy 
products, representing 38 percent of the value of U.S. 
dairy  exports. Asian  markets  (China,  Japan,  Philip-
pines, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia and Vietnam) were 
the next most important as destinations for U.S. dairy 
exports in 2006. 
Why did it take so long for the U.S. dairy industry 
to become a bigger player in export markets? It turns 
out  that  Stuartʼs  forecast  about  the  loss  of  govern-
ment assistance for the U.S. dairy industry was slow 
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Table 1. U.S. Export Figures for NDM, Butter and Cheese, 1992–2007.
Year  NDM   % of  Butter   % of  Cheese   % of 
  Exports   Production  Exports   Production  Export  Production 
  (1,000 mt)    (1,000 mt)    (1,000 mt)
1992  118   29.8  139   22.5   15   0.5
1993  138   31.9   145   24.3   19   0.6
1994  123   22.0   94   16.0   25   0.8
1995  164   29.3   64   11.2   28   0.9
1996   32   6.6   19   3.6   32   1.0
1997  117   21.2   18   3.4   38   1.1
1998  104   20.2   3   0.6   37   1.1
1999  217   35.2   2   0.4   38   1.1
2000  142   21.6   4   0.7   47   1.2
2001   96   15.0   0   0.0   53   1.4
2002  126   17.4   3   0.5   54   1.4
2003  141   19.6   12   2.1   52   1.3
2004  231   36.0   9   1.6   61   1.5
2005  277   40.0   9   1.5   58   1.4
2006 (P)   287   41.8   11   1.7   71   1.6
2007 (F)   270   41.4   15   2.3   90   2.0
Source: USDA-FAS, Dairy: World Markets and Trade, various issues, 1997–2007 [38].
P = Preliminary, F = Forecast. Babcock Institute Discussion Paper No. 2008-1  5
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to materialize. Thus, the incentives for the U.S. dairy 
industry to export were muted by continued govern-
ment support for the industry. But government support 
is eroding gradually as Suber indicated and the U.S. 
dairy  industry  now  ﬁnds  itself  in  a  position  where 
exports add important value to the industry. A host of 
other recent developments discussed in this paper also 
pushed the U.S. dairy industry toward a greater export 
orientation. In addition, other forces are inﬂuencing 
foreign direct investment by U.S. dairy companies and 
FDI in U.S. dairy-food businesses
This  paper  (a)  summarizes  key  elements  of  the 
competitive environment facing the U.S. dairy indus-
try, emphasizing those affecting U.S. dairy exports, (b) 
chronicles the decline in government support for the 
U.S. dairy industry, (c) shows how U.S. ﬁrms rank in 
the world dairy business and discusses how exporting 
and FDI strategies of leading U.S. dairy ﬁrms have 
evolved in recent years, and (d) discusses trends in 
FDI by U.S. dairy-food businesses and FDI in the U.S. 
dairy industry. The points are covered with an eye to 
assessing how each will inﬂuence the future role of 
U.S. dairy industry in world dairy markets. 
The Competitive Environment Facing  
the U.S. Dairy Industry
The key elements in the competitive environment 
outlined below will shape exporting prospects for the 
U.S. dairy industry and opportunities for FDI by U.S. 
dairy-food companies during the next few years: 
•  Deregulation and reductions in support for 
domestic dairy industries are taking place around 
the world. Prominent examples include the 
deregulation and removal of most government 
support for New Zealandʼs dairy industry 
beginning in 1984, the deregulation of Australiaʼs 
dairy industry in 2000 which made that industry 
arguably the most deregulated in the world, 
and the on-going deregulation and removal of 
government support for the European Union 
(EU) dairy industry that began in the 1990s and 
that is likely to include elimination of EU farm 
milk production quotas after 2014/2015. These 
steps by other countries were taken, in part, to 
increase the international competitiveness of their 
dairy industries. These developments mean more 
vigorous competition for the U.S. dairy industry 
in world markets. 
•  Increased production of ethanol and other 
biofuels in the U.S. has increased corn and 
soybean prices in the U.S., raising milk 
production costs and probably constraining milk 
production in the U.S. These developments have 
the potential to reduce U.S. supplies of dairy 
products available for export. The biofuels boom 
is having similar effects in certain other dairy 
exporting countries.
•  The North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA), which became effective in 1994, 
increased the competitiveness of U.S. dairy 
products in Mexico and helped to make that 
country a leading destination for U.S. dairy 
exports. The NAFTA eliminated Mexicoʼs tariff 
on imports of U.S. cheese in 2003, giving U.S. 
cheese exporters about a 20 percent advantage 
relative to third country exporters of cheese to 
Mexico. In January 2008, Mexicoʼs tariff on U.S. 
milk powder imports will go to zero. Mexico 
is likely to remain substantially short of self-
sufﬁciency in milk production for the foreseeable 
future, maintaining opportunities for large U.S. 
dairy exports to that country. 
•  While Canada did not reduce barriers to U.S. 
dairy products under the NAFTA, Canada has 
become a relatively large market for U.S. dairy 
exports because of proximity advantages enjoyed 
by U.S. ﬁrms for serving the market, similarity 
of economic conditions in Canada to those in the 
U.S. market, high consumer incomes in Canada, 
connections U.S. dairy ﬁrms have developed 
with food manufacturers in Canada, and other 
factors. However, Canada has expanded dairy 
exports to the U.S. at about the same rate that 
the U.S. has expanded dairy exports to Canada, 
producing an approximate wash in the dairy trade 
balance between the two countries. 
•  Negotiations for the Doha Round WTO 
Agreement remained stalled in late 2007. 
Moreover, opposition to multilateral and 
bilateral trade agreements is growing in the 
U.S. Congress, signaling lower interest on the The Future Role of the U.S. in World Dairy Markets
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part of the Congress in approving additional 
trade agreements. Thus, in the immediate future 
there will be little additional opening of the 
U.S. market to foreign dairy products and little 
additional opening of foreign markets to U.S. 
dairy products via new trade agreements. 
•  The value of the U.S. dollar has declined sharply 
in foreign exchange markets (Figure 2). For 
example, the dollar has fallen from about $0.92 
to the Euro in 2000 to over $1.45 to the Euro 
in October-November, 2007 (over 50 percent). 
In view of the large current account deﬁcits of 
about $750 billion per year in prospect for the 
U.S. until at least 2012, the U.S. dollar is likely 
to remain weak for the foreseeable future [14]. 
This development has lowered the price of U.S. 
dairy products for many foreign customers. 
Simultaneously, it makes many foreign 
acquisitions of dairy-food ﬁrms more expensive 
for U.S. ﬁrms and increases the incentives for 
foreigners to acquire U.S. dairy-food businesses. 
•  The U.S. dairy-food market has evolved into 
a “mixed bag” for U.S. companies. While 
consumer incomes on average are high in the 
U.S. and the market is familiar, it is a highly 
competitive market. Indeed, a Nestle ofﬁcial 
characterized the U.S. and Western European 
dairy-food markets as being “ﬂat and ﬁercely 
competitive [33].” A number of U.S. dairy-food 
ﬁrms have characterized the U.S. market as being 
“ﬁercely competitive.” U.S. consumers also have 
developed a taste for exotic foreign cheeses, 
making those items big import items. The latter 
development creates strong competition for U.S. 
cheese businesses but also gives U.S. companies 
opportunities to employ import substitution 
strategies to displace some foreign cheeses with 
U.S.-produced specialty cheeses. 
•  Several U.S. cooperatives have outsourced the 
exporting of NDM to Fonterra of New Zealand 
via an organization called Dairy America. This 
has enabled the U.S. cooperatives to concentrate 
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on serving the domestic market and puts the 
cooperativesʼ NDM exporting in the hands 
of Fonterra, their principal competitor for 
international milk powder sales. This action 
deprives the U.S. cooperatives of experience in 
exporting dairy products, experience that could 
prove valuable in the years ahead. There is also 
the question of a conﬂict of interest involving 
Fonterra. Will Fonterra, which has New Zealand 
milk powder to export, obtain the highest prices 
for the NDM it markets for U.S. cooperatives? 
Why this curious arrangement is not terminated 
is a mystery. 
•  U.S. dairy exporters will face important risks and 
uncertainties in international dairy markets over 
the longer-run. China and Brazil, for example, 
represent “wild cards” in international dairy 
markets. These countries could either remain 
net importers of dairy products or, at least in 
the case of Brazil, become dairy exporters. The 
attractiveness of the international dairy markets 
for U.S. ﬁrms will depend partly on what the 
dairy industries of these countries ultimately do. 
These  economic  environment  factors  foreshadow 
important changes in U.S. and world dairy markets. In 
particular, globalization trends which, until recently, 
have affected the U.S. dairy industry in modest ways 
are becoming more important to the industry. More-
over, globalization-related developments, which can 
strongly affect U.S. dairy exports, and FDI are occur-
ring despite the lack of progress on multilateral trade 
agreements. 
Declining Real Government Support for the 
U.S. Dairy Industry
The declining real government support for much of 
the U.S. dairy industry has increased the incentives of 
dairy companies to export. U.S. Government support 
for the U.S. dairy industry takes several forms, includ-
ing the dairy price support program (product purchase 
program), the DEIP export subsidy program, border 
protection (chieﬂy tariff rate quotas on dairy product 
imports), federal milk orders, and the milk income loss 
program (direct payments). In this paper we are mainly 
concerned  with  changes  in  the  ﬁrst  three  programs 
since these programs will have the greatest impact on 
the future role of U.S. dairy industry in world mar-
kets. 
Dairy Price Support Program. Legislative author-
ity for the dairy price support program rests with the 
Agricultural  Act  of  1949  as  amended  (1949  Act). 
The USDA administers this program by announcing 
purchase prices for butter, cheese and NDM. These 
purchase prices are set so that, theoretically, ﬁrms of 
average processing efﬁciency can pay producers the 
support price for manufacturing milk. 
U.S. price supports for manufacturing milk have 
exhibited a general decline in recent decades. Prior to 
October 1981, the 1949 Act required that the support 
price for manufacturing milk be set at 75–90 percent 
of parity [2]. Under this archaic provision of the leg-
islation, the support price for manufacturing milk rose 
steadily to $13.49 per hundredweight in October 1981, 
leading to large surpluses of dairy products and record 
USDA outlays for dairy price supports. 
Between  October  1981  and  October  1990,  the 
support price for milk fell by more than 25 percent 
to $10.10 per hundredweight [2]. The support price 
remained at that level through December 1995, before 
increasing to $10.35 per hundredweight on January 1, 
1996. 
The 1996 Farm Bill actually scheduled the USDAʼs 
dairy price support program for elimination. Under the 
1996 legislation, the manufacturing milk support price 
was  set  at  $10.35  per  hundredweight  for  1996  and 
annual reductions of $0.15 per hundredweight in the 
support price were established for 1997 and 1998. The 
program was then supposed to end on December 31, 
1999. The Congress subsequently extended the dairy 
price support program to the present day with manu-
facturing milk support prices set at $9.90 per hundred-
weight. 
There were several reasons for the planned elimina-
tion of the dairy price support program in 1996. First, 
presumably crafters of the 1996 Farm Bill thought that 
domestic demand for dairy products would be sufﬁ-
ciently strong that the program would not be needed. 
Secondly, it was recognized that U.S. border protection 
measures would limit imports of foreign dairy imports 
and help to keep domestic dairy product prices rela-
tively strong. Third, the 1996 Farm Bill contained pro-The Future Role of the U.S. in World Dairy Markets
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visions for recourse loans for dairy plants that would 
become effective after the dairy price support program 
was eliminated. It was reasoned that the recourse loan 
program would ease processorsʼ apprehensions about 
elimination of the product purchase program. 
In addition, eliminating the U.S. dairy price sup-
port program reduced the U.S.ʼs Aggregate Measure 
of Support outlays (“Amber Box” or trade-distorting 
expenditures) under the Uruguay Round WTO Agree-
ment. This was viewed by some policymakers as an 
important beneﬁt because U.S. dairy price supports 
made major claims on the allowed Aggregate Measure 
of Support (AMS) outlays for the U.S. Large AMS 
claims  associated  with  dairy  price  supports  result 
because U.S. AMS outlays are measured as the differ-
ence between the U.S. support price and a base period 
world market reference price for manufacturing milk 
multiplied by total U.S. milk production, producing 
multibillion dollar claims on the AMS total.
Product  purchases  under  the  USDA  dairy  price 
support program for 1996 through 2006 are shown in 
Table 2. Clearly, the major purchases under the pro-
gram were for NDM. Indeed, in 2002 and 2003 about 
40 percent of U.S. NDM production was purchased 
under the price support program, leading to a struc-
tural surplus of NDM at the prevailing support prices 
for the product. 
U.S. government stocks of NDM rose to 468,830 
metric tons and 498,643 metric tons in 2002 and 2003, 
respectively  (Appendix  Table  1).  The  USDA  also 
became the major holder of NDM stocks, accounting 
for about 90 percent of total stocks of the product in 
2002 and 2003.
Butter  and  cheese  purchases  under  the  USDAʼs 
dairy price support program were small, equivalent to 
less than one percent of production of these products 
for 1996–2006.
The large purchases of NDM prompted the USDA 
to lower the support price for this product in 2001 
and 2002, ultimately bringing the NDM support price 
down to $0.80 per pound (Table 3). Simultaneously, 
the butter support price was raised to $1.05 per pound 
under what is referred to as adjustment of the “butter-
powder tilt.” The “tilt” adjustment permitted the man-
ufacturing milk support price to remain at about $9.90 
per  hundredweight  after  the  reduction  in  the  NDM 
support price. 
The adjustments in the support prices for the 1995 
to 2007 period are shown at the bottom of Table 3. 
Nominal NDM support prices declined by nearly 23 
Table 2. USDA Purchases under the Dairy Price Support Program, 1996–2006.
Year   NDM   % of U.S.   Butter  % of U.S.   Cheese  % of U.S 
   Purchases   Production   Purchases   Production   Purchases   Production 
  (1,000 mt)    (1,000 mt)    (1,000 mt)
1996   0   0.0   0   0.0   0   0.00
1997  17,990   3.3  0   0.0   328   0.01
1998  51,495   10.0   0   0.0  0   0.00
1999  107,465   17.4   0   0.0  0   0.00
2000   238,408   36.2   0   0.0   3,530   0.09
2001  161,857   25.2   0   0.0   206   0.01
2002  308,534   42.6   0   0.0   2,566   0.07
2003  288,714   40.0   4,596   0.8   3,905   0.10
2004  125,991   19.7   –19  —   0   0.00
2005  0   0.0   0   0.0  0   0.00
2006   29,026   4.2   0   0.0  0   0.00
Sources: USDA-AMS, Dairy Market Statistics, 1996–2007 [35] and USDA-FAS, Dairy: World Markets and Trade, various 
issues 2000–2007 [37]. USDA price support purchases represent adjusted Commodity Credit Corporation purchases, contract 
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The Future Role of the U.S. in World Dairy Markets
percent over the period, while butter support prices 
increased  by  61  percent  over  the  period.  Nominal 
cheddar cheese and manufacturing milk prices showed 
little change over the period. 
However,  in  real  (inﬂation  adjusted)  terms  large 
reductions in NDM, cheddar cheese, and manufactur-
ing milk support prices are evident over the 1995–2007 
period. Real butter support prices also show a more 
modest  gain  (24  percent)  than  the  nominal  support 
prices over the period. 
Market prices that exceed support levels and pro-
ductivity  increases  have  permitted  many  U.S.  milk 
producers and dairy processors to remain in business 
despite the declining real government support prices 
for certain dairy products. 
The lower U.S. NDM support price, booming global 
demand for the product, and shortfalls in NDM pro-
duction in Australia, the EU, and some other countries 
changed price relationships for the product in the mid-
2000s (Table 4). U.S. prices for NDM dropped below 
those for Oceania and Europe beginning in 2004 after 
being more than 60 percent higher than F.O.B. prices 
in these regions in 1998 and 1999. The U.S. went from 
being  priced  out  of  the  international  NDM  market 
(unless export subsidies were employed) to being the 
low-priced market in 2004–2007. The price compari-
sons in Table 4, of course, are imperfect indicators of 
international  competitiveness  but  show  that  market 
price relationships among U.S., Oceania and European 
markets have changed substantially to favor expanded 
U.S. exports of NDM. 
Table 3. USDA Support Prices for NDM, Butter and Cheddar Cheese, 1995–2007.
Year  NDM  Butter  Cheddar Cheese   Mfging Milk 
  (U.S.$/lb)  (U.S.$/lb)  (U.S.$/lb)  (U.S.$/cwt)
1995   $1.034   $0.65   $1.120   $10.10
1996   1.065   0.65   1.145   10.35
1997   1.047   0.65   1.130   10.20
1998   1.028   0.65   1.115   10.05
1999   1.010   0.65   1.100   9.90
2000   1.010   0.6590   1.111   9.90
2001   0.9344   0.7882   1.131   9.90
2002   0.8833   0.8873   1.131   9.90
2003   0.800   1.05   1.131   9.90
2004   0.800   1.05   1.131   9.90
2005   0.800   1.05   1.131   9.90
2006   0.800   1.05   1.131   9.90
2007   0.800   1.05   1.131   9.90
% Change, 1995–2007
Nominal terms   –22.6   +61.5   +1.0  –2.0
Real Terms   –40.6   +24.0   –22.5   –24.8
Sources: Support prices from USDA-ERS [37]. Producer Price Index Figures used to express price 
changes in real terms from U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics [10,11]. Butter 
prices for 2000 and NDM and butter support prices for 2001 and 2002 represent weighted averages 
of the monthly support prices for these products. Support prices for NDM are for 50-pound bags. 
Support prices for cheddar cheese are those for 40-pound blocks. Real price changes from 1995 to 
2007 were computed using as a deﬂator the Producer Price Index for Intermediate Materials, Foods 
and Feeds, 1982 = 100. The Future Role of the U.S. in World Dairy Markets
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While other forces shaped NDM export sales, the 
impact of the lower USDA support price for NDM 
on the competitiveness of U.S. NDM should not be 
underestimated.  From  1995  through  2003,  the  U.S. 
support price for NDM was actually higher than the 
F.O.B. market prices for NDM in Oceania and Europe 
[35]. Hence, the support price provided disincentives 
for exports of NDM and limited U.S. non-subsidized 
exports of the product until 2004. 
While international markets for U.S. NDM are likely 
to be robust for the near future, the situation for U.S. 
butter is more uncertain. U.S. prices for butter have 
been higher than butter prices for Oceania and Europe 
for much of the time since 1996 (Appendix Table 2). 
During 2005 and 2006, for example, U.S. butter prices 
averaged 57 percent and 58 percent higher, respec-
tively, than in Oceania and Europe. Moreover, in the 
2000s (with the exception of the ﬁrst nine months of 
2007), the U.S. support price for butter has been higher 
than F.O.B. prices for butter in Oceania and Europe 
(Appendix Table 2). Thus, the higher support prices 
for butter associated in part with the NDM-butter “tilt” 
in the early 2000s priced U.S. butter out of interna-
tional markets until 2007.
U.S. butter prices became more internationally com-
petitive in 2007 when Oceania butter prices approxi-
mately  doubled  and  those  in  Europe  tripled  from 
January to September, 2007. As a result, U.S. butter 
exports for January-September 2007 rose to about 21 
thousand metric tons, up substantially from the full-
year average of about seven thousand metric tons (1.2 
percent of production) for 2000 through 2006. 
It is uncertain whether U.S. butter prices can remain 
competitive in international markets if Oceania and 
Europe  prices  return  to  more  normal  levels.  Also, 
butter sold in international markets differs from that 
marketed in the U.S.—much of the bulk butter sold 
internationally is unsalted butter with a butterfat con-
tent of 82 percent while U.S. butter is salted and con-
tains 80 percent butterfat. Therefore, U.S. companies 
would need to change manufacturing procedures to 
produce  to  speciﬁcation  for  the  international  butter 
market. Accordingly, some U.S. ﬁrms are likely to gear 
up to produce for the international butter market only 
Table 4. U.S., Oceania and Europe NDM Prices, 1995–2007.
  US NDM  Oceania NDM   Europe NDM            
  Price  Price  Price                    U.S. Price as % of Price for 
Year  (U.S.$/mt)  (U.S.$/mt)  (U.S.$/mt)  Oceania  Europe 
1995   2,326   2,138  2,144   108.8   108.5
1996   2,581  1,915   1,986   134.8   130.0
1997   2,362  1,905   1,975   124.0   119.6
1998   2,326  1,420   1,444   163.8   161.1
1999   2,233  1,316   1,331   169.7   167.8
2000   2,217  1,873   1,887   118.4   117.5
2001   2,174  2,056   2,012   105.7   108.1
2002   2,028  1,367   1,352   148.4   150.0
2003   1,855  1,742   1,742   106.5   106.5
2004   1,878  2,018   2,068   93.1   90.8
2005   2,097  2,225   2,262   94.2   92.7
2006   1,993  2,212   2,522   90.1   79.0
2007*  3,459  3,671   4,016   94.2   86.1
Sources: Prices obtained from USDA-AMS, Dairy Market Statistics [35]. U.S. prices are for low and medium 
heat NDM for the West region. Oceania and Europe prices are F.O.B. port. 
*Figures for 2007 are for ﬁrst half of the year. Babcock Institute Discussion Paper No. 2008-1  11
The Future Role of the U.S. in World Dairy Markets
if price differentials favor producing butter for export 
for an extended period. 
The  Dairy  Export  Incentive  Program.  The  DEIP 
was ﬁrst authorized under the 1985 Farm Bill and was 
extended to the present under subsequent legislation. 
The  DEIP  is  an  export  subsidy  program  similar  to 
the export enhancement program used for other U.S. 
agricultural commodities. The program provides cash 
export subsidies based on the difference between the 
U.S. and world market prices to approved exporters 
from bids submitted by exporters to the USDA for spe-
ciﬁc dairy products and markets. 
DEIP export subsidies are governed by WTO rules. 
The  U.S.  is  currently  permitted  to  export  approxi-
mately the following quantities of dairy products each 
year with subsidy under limits established under the 
Uruguay Round WTO Agreement:
•  Butter: 21,100 metric tons.
•  Milk Powder: 68,200 metric tons
•  Cheese: 3,000 metric tons 
U.S. and other negotiators agreed to eliminate all 
agricultural  export  subsidies  by  2013  at  the  Hong 
Kong, China Ministerial Meetings for the Doha Round 
of WTO negotiations in December 2005. However, the 
Doha Round negotiations are stalled and the conces-
sions regarding export subsidies will not be binding 
until an agreement on all other components of the Doha 
Round is completed. When, if ever, full agreement will 
be reached under the Doha Round is unclear. 
DEIP bid acceptances during 1996–2006 appear in 
Table 5. While DEIP export subsidies for NDM and 
cheese were used up to the WTO limits for 2000–01 
through 2003–04, the subsidies have not been used in 
later periods. WTO ﬂexibility provisions during the 
Uruguay Round WTO implementation period permit-
ted the U.S. to exceed the current export subsidy limits 
prior to 2000–01. 
High world prices for NDM eliminated the need for 
DEIP export subsidies for this product after 2003–04. 
Whether DEIP export subsidies will be used in the 
future for U.S. NDM is unclear. The maximum allow-
able DEIP exports subsidies for butter/butteroil and 
cheese were equivalent to only about 3.5 percent and 
0.07 percent, respectively, of the annual U.S. produc-
tion of butter and cheese during the 2000s. Hence, the 
DEIP has not been a big factor affecting exports of 
these products.
Despite the limits on use of the DEIP subsidies for 
butter  and  cheese,  the  program  has  given  valuable 
exporting experience to a number of U.S. dairy com-
panies including Land OʼLakes, Schreiber Cheese, and 
Associated Milk Producers, Inc. Among other things, 
the DEIP has alerted the ﬁrms to the need to produce 
dairy products to speciﬁcation for foreign markets. 
Border Protection Measures. The Uruguay Round 
WTO Agreement,  which  became  effective  in  1995, 
had noteworthy effects on U.S. dairy imports. The key 
requirement in the agreement pertaining to U.S. dairy 
imports speciﬁed that all non-tariff barriers (quotas, 
import licenses, etc.) must be converted to tariffs and 
reduced by an average of 36 percent over six years, 
with a minimum reduction of at least 15 percent from 
1986–88 base levels. 
TABLE 5.   Dairy Export Incentive Bid Acceptances, 1996–
2006.
      (mt of bid acceptances) 
     Whole Milk  Butter/    
Year  NDM  Powder  Butteroil  Cheese 
Calendar Years   
1996   45,130   2,486   0   2,455
1997   138,319   7,213   24,617   4,291
Fiscal Period
1997–98  92,216   7,487   15,648   3,510
1998–99   84,212   5,003   395   3,122
1999–00  101,383   17,908   5,298   3,865
2000–01  68,201   0   0   3,030
2001–02  68,201   0   0   3,030
2002–03  68,201   0   0   3,030
2003–04   68,201   0   0   3,030
2004–05   0   0   0   0
2005–06   0   0   0   0
2006 Jul–Dec.   0   0   0   0
Source: USDA-AMS, Dairy Market Statistics, 1996–2006 [35]. 
The Fiscal Periods shown run from July 1 through June 30 of the 
years shown. The Future Role of the U.S. in World Dairy Markets
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In  part,  U.S.  whey  export  prospects  are  robust 
because there is no USDA price support program for 
whey that prices this product out of international mar-
kets. Secondly, the large U.S. cheese industry, which 
claimed about 36 percent of U.S. milk in 2005, gen-
erates many whey products as companion outputs of 
the cheese business. Thirdly, foreign processors have 
been  savvy  about  opportunities  to  substitute  whey 
for expensive NDM in the production of a host of 
products. Finally, on a related point, the versatility of 
whey for use in products ranging from animal feeds 
to energy bars helps to make whey a growth item in 
international  markets.  These  factors  should  help  to 
keep whey exports, which were approximately double 
2006 levels for the ﬁrst nine months of 2007, at high 
levels in the future. Future U.S. cheese exports are dif-
ﬁcult to assess because of the heterogeneity of cheese 
products. But, U.S. cheese exports, which accounted 
for 13 percent of U.S. dairy product exports by value 
in 2006, will probably remain relatively strong in the 
next few years. Mexico, which was the destination for 
about one-third of the value of U.S. cheese exports 
in 2006, holds promise as a growth market for U.S. 
cheese partly because of the preferential access Mex-
Prior to the Uruguay Round WTO Agreement, U.S. 
dairy markets were protected by Section 22 quotas 
provided by the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, 
as amended, which prevented dairy imports from inter-
fering with the USDAʼs price support program. The 
Section 22 quotas were converted to tariff-rate quotas 
under the Uruguay Round WTO agreement. The over-
quota tariffs applicable to U.S. dairy imports in 2000 
(after the WTO implementation period) were as fol-
lows: 
    Over-Quota Tariff in 2000  
Product  and later Periods
NDM  39.2 cents/lb.
Butter  69.9 cents/lb.
Cheese  55.6 cents/lb.
Under the Uruguay Round WTO Agreement, coun-
tries were also required to ensure that current access 
opportunities for imports were maintained and to open 
up minimum access opportunities in cases where there 
was little or no trade. When current access for a prod-
uct was less than 3 percent, countries were required to 
open up a minimum amount of access. This access was 
to be increased to 5 percent by 2000. 
The Uruguay Round WTO Agreement had a sub-
stantial impact on U.S. cheese imports. In absolute 
terms, yearly U.S. cheese imports averaged 43 percent 
higher during 2000 to 2007 than during 1992 to 1994 
[38]. However, the change between the two periods in 
annual U.S. cheese imports was much smaller as a per-
centage of consumption. U.S. cheese imports averaged 
4.89 percent of U.S. consumption from 2000 to 2007. 
This compared to average imports of 4.56 percent of 
domestic consumption between 1992 and 1994. Addi-
tional within-quota U.S. cheese imports are likely to 
be permitted if the Doha Round WTO agreement is 
ever completed. 
What does information in this section suggest about 
the U.S. role in world dairy markets? Approximate 
export market shares of U.S. dairy exporters for NDM, 
butter, and cheese in 2007 appear in Table 6. The large 
NDM export ﬁgure for the U.S. is no surprise. For rea-
sons noted earlier, export markets for U.S. NDM are 
likely to remain strong for at least the next few years. 
The same is true for whey products. 
TABLE 6.   Dairy Export Market Shares for Selected Major 
Exporting Countries, 2007.
Country  NDM  Butter  Cheese 
  (%)  (%)  (%)
U.S.   25.4  1.9  7.0
EU-25   9.4   32.7   42.7
Argentina   1.9  —   4.5
India   5.6   1.3   —
Australia   16.5   8.8   15.6
New Zealand   29.2   50.3   23.3
Others   12.0   5.0   6.8
Totals for Selected Countries:
    %  100.0   100.0   99.9
    (1,000 mt)   1,062   795   1,287
Source: USDA-FAS, Dairy: World Markets and Trade, July 2007 
[38]. Figures for 2007 are USDA forecasts. Total percentage for 
selected countries for cheese does not add to 100.0% because of 
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ico gives U.S. cheese under the NAFTA Agreement 
[16]. 
Increased  U.S.  production  of  specialty  cheeses 
should  permit  these  cheeses  to  displace  increased 
amounts of exotic European cheeses and claim more of 
the multi-billion dollar U.S. specialty cheese market. 
Specialty cheese production in Wisconsin has exhib-
ited a strong upward trajectory in recent years and in 
2005 accounted for about 15 percent of Wisconsinʼs 
total cheese production [39]. Thus, Wisconsinʼs cheese 
industry is likely to ﬁgure prominently in import sub-
stitution activity to displace more of the European spe-
cialty cheeses in the U.S. 
It might be argued that U.S. buyers of European 
specialty cheeses are not price sensitive and will not 
reduce the amount of exotic European cheeses pur-
chased in the next few years. This argument ignores 
the amount that prices for European specialty cheeses 
will increase in the U.S. if, as is likely, the exchange 
rate remains at approximately U.S.$1.45 to U.S.$1.50 
to the Euro. It also ignores the effects of increases in 
the variety and quality of U.S. specialty cheeses on 
U.S. consumption of domestically-produced specialty 
cheeses. 
The U.S. dairy industry, of course, will be compet-
ing with counterpart industries in a number of other 
countries to supply the global demand for dairy prod-
ucts in future years. Countries which have major dairy 
industries and that compete strongly with the U.S. for 
export markets include those listed in Table 7. 
The U.S. has exhibited fairly steady annual increases 
in milk production during the 2000s, which augurs well 
for the countryʼs dairy exporting potential. The minis-
cule year-to-year increases in EU-25 milk production 
reﬂect the effects of quotas. EU milk production quo-
tas will likely limit EU-25 milk production and export-
ing capacity until after 2014/2015 when the quotas are 
expected to end. Moreover, prior to 2014/2015 avail-
able EU supplies of milk are likely to be used to pro-
duce additional value-added products such as cheese 
rather than to increase NDM production. 
U.S. dairy exporters will ﬁnd it useful to monitor 
EU-25 milk production and dairy exporting capabili-
ties after quotas end since exports from several EU 
countries could increase substantially after the quota 
shackles are removed. However, the U.S. will have 
a window of opportunity from 2008 to 2014/2015 to 
expand dairy exports, especially of NDM and whey 
TABLE 7. Changes in Fluid Milk Production, Selected Countries, 2000 to 2007.
  2007 Milk     % Average    
  Production  % Change,  Year-to-Year   
Country   (1,000 mt)  2000–07  Change, 2000–07  Comments
U.S.  85,445   12.53  1.72  Mostly steady annual increases
EU-25  131,500   1.63   0.23  Small quota-constrained annual increases 
New Zealand  15,600  27.50   3.58    Lower rates of annual increase in later years of 2000 to 2007 
period
Australia  9,785  –12.41  –1.77    Production reduced by drought in recent years of 2000 to 
2007 period
Argentina  10,800   10.20   1.75    Production has recovered from recession-related shortfalls in 
the early 2000s
Brazil  25,365  14.60   1.97    Highest rates of increase recorded in mid-to-late part of 2000 
to 2007 period
China  38,100   360.48   24.51    Very high rates of increase slowed modestly in 2005 to 2007
Russia  32,000  0.31   0.08  No discernible production trend 
Source: USDA-FAS, Dairy: World Markets and Trade, selected issues, 2005–2007 [38].
Figures for 2006 and 2007 used to construct the table are preliminary and forecasts, respectively.The Future Role of the U.S. in World Dairy Markets
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products—prior to the end of EU milk quotas and the 
likely resurgence of EU exporting capabilities. 
New  Zealand  will  continue  to  be  a  major  dairy 
exporting country, but possibilities for added domes-
tic milk production in that country are limited. Aus-
tralia  must  recover  from  the  severe  drought  before 
dairy exports from that country will realize their full 
potential. Argentina has the potential to expand dairy 
exports because the country has recovered from reces-
sion-related shortfalls in milk production in the early 
2000s. However, it is not clear that Argentinaʼs gov-
ernment  will  maintain  macroeconomic  policies  that 
will permit the countryʼs dairy industry to realize its 
full exporting potential.
Brazil and China, as noted earlier, represent “wild 
cards” in international dairy markets. Both countries 
have  recorded  relatively  large  percentage  increases 
in milk production in recent years. Both have large 
domestic populations (190 million for Brazil and 1.3 
billion for China), which could absorb most of the 
available dairy product supplies. Brazil, partly because 
of its lower population relative to milk production, pre-
sumably is more likely to evolve into a dairy exporting 
country than China. However, both countries should be 
watched for important developments relating to their 
dairy importing and exporting prospects. While pock-
ets of expanding dairy activity are occurring in Russia, 
there is no discernible overall trend in milk production 
in that country that would signal an ability for Russia 
to expand dairy exports. 
In a statement that has summary implications for 
this section, Mr. Linwood Tipton, former CEO of the 
International Dairy Foods Association, commented as 
follows in 2006 about how much world dairy demand 
will increase in the next ﬁve years and the U.S. role in 
satisfying that demand [32]:
. . . the demand for globally-traded dairy products 
will increase about 20 percent over the next ﬁve 
years, and the U.S. dairy industry is well positioned 
to ﬁll the gap and become a major competitive force 
in the world.
This section did not address the question of how 
much global dairy demand will increase in the next 
ﬁve years. However, if global demand does increase 
by about 20 percent in this period the U.S. dairy indus-
try appears well situated to supply a signiﬁcant part of 
that demand increase, especially for NDM and whey 
products.
How U.S. Firms Rank in the World’s  
Top-20 Dairy Companies
The measures affecting the international competi-
tiveness of the U.S. dairy industry discussed previously 
relate mostly to dairy commodities. How competitive 
the U.S. dairy industry will be in international markets 
for value-added dairy products depends partly on the 
competitive strategies of major U.S. dairy companies. 
Which U.S. dairy-food companies could be formi-
dable international competitors? Five U.S.-based dairy 
ﬁrms  rank  in  the  worldʼs Top-20  in  terms  of  dairy 
TABLE 8.   The Worldʼs Top 20 Dairy Companies Measured 
by Dairy Sales, 2006.
  Headquarters   Dairy  
Company  Location  Sales ($ Bil.)
  1. Nestle  Switzerland   $18.6
  2. Lactalis  France  10.4
  3. Groupe Danone  France  10.0
  4. Dean Foods  U.S.  9.3
  5. Arla Foods  Denmark  8.7
  6. Fonterra  New Zealand  8.5
  7. Dairy Farmers of Am.  U.S.  7.9
  8. Kraft Foods  U.S.  6.4
  9. Unilever  Netherlands & UK   5.5
10. Friesland Foods  Netherlands   5.5
11. Campina  Netherlands   4.6
12. Parmalat  Italy  4.3
13. Bongrain  France  4.2
14. Meiji Dairies  Japan  4.1
15. Saputo  Canada  3.9
16. Morinaga  Japan  3.8
17. Schreiber Foods  U.S.  3.1
18. Land OʼLakes  U.S.  2.8
19. Muller  Germany  2.6
20. Dairy Crest  UK  2.5
Rabobank International as reported in Export Proﬁle, September 
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sales. The ﬁve ﬁrms are: Dean Foods, Kraft Foods, 
Dairy Farmers of America, Schreiber Foods and Land 
OʼLakes (Table 8). Dairy Farmers of American and 
Land OʼLakes are farmer cooperatives. Dean Foods 
and  Kraft  are  publicly-held  corporations.  Schreiber 
Foods is an employee-owned ﬁrm. 
U.S.  companies  recorded  some  of  the  slowest 
growth  rates  during  the  ﬁve-year  period  ending  in 
2006. For example, Dean Foods and Kraft reported 
sales increases of 16 percent and 7 percent, respec-
tively, over the ﬁve-year period [34]. This compares to 
increases of 37 percent, 117 percent, and 61 percent for 
Nestle, Lactalis, and Group Danone, respectively, for 
the same ﬁve-year period. USDEC attributes the faster 
growth of the foreign ﬁrms partly to their rapid expan-
sion of sales outside their domestic markets [34]. 
Exporting and FDI Strategies of  
U.S. “Big-5” Dairy Firms 
The  following  section  analyzes  strategies  of  the 
U.S. “Big-5” dairy ﬁrms to obtain insights about the 
likely future role of the U.S. dairy industry in world 
dairy markets for value-added products in particular. 
Dean Foods. Dean Foods is a domestically-oriented 
ﬂuid milk company. The company, which represents 
the December 2001 merger of the original Dean Foods 
and Suiza, is the largest ﬂuid milk processor in the 
U.S., operating 98 plants at the end of 2006 [8]. The 
original Dean Foods (after which the current company 
is named) and Suiza were responsible for much of the 
increased concentration in the U.S. ﬂuid milk business 
that occurred from the 1970s through the early 2000s. 
Dean  Foods  is  a  company  in  transition,  which 
recently has focused on improving efﬁciencies. It also 
repurchased some $400 million of company stock in 
2006 and made a one-time cash dividend payment of 
$15 per share to all Dean stockholders ($2.0 billion in 
total) in 2007 [8]. These actions represent the behavior 
expected of an acquisition-oriented ﬁrm that ﬁnds only 
a limited number of attractive acquisition targets. 
At the same time, the company has expanded into 
niche soymilk and organic milk markets in the U.S. and 
decreased foreign operations. Regarding the last point, 
Dean Foods sold its ﬂuid milk operations in Spain and 
Portugal in 2006 and 2007, concluding that “. . . there 
are other organizations that may be better positioned 
to take advantage of the Iberian market [8, p. 24].” 
However, the company retained the Rachelʼs organic 
milk business in the UK [8, p. 13]. Dean reports that 
Rachelʼs was the leading brand of organic milk in the 
UK in 2006. The company plans to introduce Rachelʼs 
line of yogurts to U.S. consumers. 
There is little in Deanʼs recent history to suggest 
that it will sharply expand its foreign operations. Fluid 
milk  products,  Deanʼs  specialty,  do  not  lend  them-
selves well to exports. Furthermore, Deanʼs experi-
ence in Spain and Portugal, at least, suggests that the 
companyʼs investments in foreign operations have not 
been as proﬁtable as U.S. business. Indeed, in explain-
ing the Iberian sales, Dean noted that in recent years   
“. . . our primary focus has been on our domestic oper-
ations [8, p. 24].” The emphasis on the U.S. domestic 
market appears likely to be a facet of Deanʼs strategy 
for the next few years. 
However,  international  forces  have  adversely 
affected Deansʼ proﬁtability. Mr. Greg Engles, Deanʼs 
CEO, made the following comment to explain why the 
ﬁrm lowered its 2007 proﬁt forecast for a second time 
in October 2007 [15, p.A2]:
The third quarter (of 2007) has been particularly 
challenging as dairy commodity costs have been 
rising sharply, hitting all-time highs. This is by far 
the most difﬁcult operating environment in the his-
tory of the company.
Dean Foods expected its input costs to remain high 
in the remainder of 2007 and for additional periods. 
Dean attributed the high prospective input costs partly 
to strong export demand for NDM. Deanʼs branded 
ﬂuid milk products also face formidable competition 
from private label ﬂuid milk.
Kraft Foods. Kraft is perhaps the most export- and 
FDI-oriented dairy-food business in the group. In June 
2006,  Kraft  ofﬁcials  unveiled  a  new  exporting/FDI 
strategy for 2007, which USDEC described as follows 
[34, p.4]: 
(It is) . . . designed to increase . . . (the companyʼs) 
business  on  a  global  scale,  targeting  the  fastest 
growing  developing  countries  around  the  world. 
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markets . . . The Middle East is another key market 
for Kraft cheese. The company is building a $40-
million processing/R&D facility in Bahrain, which 
will serve as its Middle Eastern hub of operations. 
Construction is expected to be complete by October 
2007.
Ms.  Irene  Rosenfeld,  Kraftʼs  CEO,  emphasized 
that the companyʼs international sales would focus on   
“. . . a select number of developing markets where 
we have sufﬁcient scale, including Brazil and Mexico   
[17, p.19].”
It is unclear how much Kraft will emphasize for-
eign sales and FDI in dairy in future years. Kraftʼs rev-
enues from cheese and dairy declined by 1.6 percent 
in 2006 in contrast to revenues for other broad product 
categories, which showed increases. Moreover, Kraftʼs 
big foreign acquisition in 2007 was Groupe Danoneʼs 
global  biscuit  business  for  $7.2  billion.  Rosenfeld 
described the wisdom of the Danone acquisition, as 
follows [18]: 
This  proposed  acquisition  makes  great  sense  for 
Kraft. It will increase our presence in snacks—our 
fastest growing global segment—and transform our 
international business. This growing high margin 
business will give Kraft another core growth cat-
egory in Europe, a cornerstone for faster growth in 
emerging markets, and the best portfolio of iconic 
biscuit brands in the world.
Whether the points listed for Kraft, on balance, will 
push the company into faster growth in foreign sales of 
dairy products is unclear. Kraft, which has emphasized 
sales in the North American market, will face strong 
competition if the ﬁrm chooses to expand dairy-food 
sales in international markets. In particular, it will be 
difﬁcult for Kraft to compete effectively against Nes-
tle and Unilever, which have generations of experi-
ence in foreign dairy-food businesses. Hence, Kraftʼs 
expansion into foreign dairy-food markets is likely to 
be modest in the future. 
Schreiber Foods. Founded  in  1945  with  a  single 
production facility located in Green Bay, Wisconsin, 
Schreiber has expanded into a company with produc-
tion-distribution facilities in nine U.S. states and four 
foreign countries (Brazil, Germany, India and Mex-
ico). Schreiber has four facilities in Wisconsin, four in 
Missouri, two in Utah, and one in Arizona, Georgia, 
Nebraska, Pennsylvania, Tennessee and Texas. 
The company describes itself as the worldʼs larg-
est private label supplier of dairy products (especially 
cheese) to grocery chains and wholesalers. A Wiki-
pedia report shows that Schreiberʼs cheese slices are 
used on cheeseburgers by 17 of the top 20 hamburger 
chains  [41,  p.1].  In  addition  to  cheese,  Schreiber 
sells milk powders, casein, whey powders, and con-
densed milk. The company makes international sales 
in Africa, Asia, Australia, Europe, North America and 
South America. 
Schreiberʼs strategies include emphasis on efﬁcient 
plant operations. Plants acquired that fail to deliver 
expected  proﬁts  have  been  shuttered  without  much 
delay.  For  example,  Schreiber  closed  a  Waukesha, 
Wisconsin cheese plant in April 2002, approximately 
two years after the plant was acquired from Beatrice 
Foods. Schreiber said excess cheese processing capac-
ity in the Midwestern U.S. forced the company to close 
the Waukesha plant [29]. 
Schreiberʼs strategies also focus on rapid domestic 
and international growth. The ﬁrm describes its growth 
as follows [27]:
Over the past 10 years, Schreiber has grown at a 
rate of close to one new manufacturing facility per 
year.  By  developing  new  products,  building  new 
plants and acquiring businesses, weʼve increased 
our customer base and market share and became 
an international leader . . .
Mr.  L.P.  Furguson,  CEO  of  Schreiber  Foods, 
described the strategic importance of the ﬁrmʼs domes-
tic expansion in the southeastern U.S. via the 2002 
acquisition of a Gainesville, Georgia plant owned by 
Winn-Dixie as follows [28]:
(The acquisition) . . . is an important strategic plat-
form for the companyʼs future . . . It enhances our 
ability  to  serve  customers  throughout  the  south-
eastern United States and Caribbean. This acquisi-
tion anchors our ability to serve existing customers 
and expand our business in the region in the years 
ahead.
Schreiberʼs  acquisition  of  a  51  percent  stake  in 
Dynamix Dairy Industries, Ltd., a Pune, India-based Babcock Institute Discussion Paper No. 2008-1  17
The Future Role of the U.S. in World Dairy Markets
food contract manufacturing ﬁrm, for 1.7 billion rupees 
(about  U.S.$38  million)  was  an  ambitious  foreign 
acquisition in 2004. Dynamix is a modern milk pro-
cessing and product manufacturing plant in Baramati, 
Pune, India which has a capacity to process 1.2 mil-
lion liters of milk per day, making it one of the largest 
cow milk-based dairy companies in India. Rabo India 
Finance described the Schreiber-Dynamix transaction 
as “. . . one of the largest deals in the food and agribusi-
ness space in India [9].” Schreiber views this invest-
ment as “. . . the ﬁrst material step towards increasing 
its presence in India and thereby in Asia [9].” 
Schreiber probably will be a noteworthy force in 
expanding U.S. dairy exports and dairy foreign invest-
ment in future years. The companyʼs record appears 
to be one of successful growth in both domestic and 
foreign markets. The venture into India undoubtedly 
carries risk, but it represents a potentially valuable plat-
form for expanded sales into Indiaʼs growing markets 
and elsewhere in Asia. Schreiber has a history of “pull-
ing the plug” on unproﬁtable investments in the U.S. 
Presumably the company will exercise similar strate-
gies regarding its investments in India and elsewhere 
in foreign markets if those investments turn sour. 
Dairy Farmers of America. Established on January 1, 
1998 through the consolidation of four regional dairy 
marketing  cooperatives,  Dairy  Farmers  of America 
(DFA) now supplies about one-third of the milk mar-
keted in the U.S. In 2006, DFA marketed 61.7 billion 
pounds of milk for dairy farmers across the U.S. [3]. 
DFA is a complex organization, featuring numerous 
joint  ventures  and  other  collaborative  arrangements 
with domestic and foreign organizations. The coopera-
tive boasts eight joint ventures with fresh milk and ice 
cream  processing  companies  located  from  coast-to-
coast in the U.S. Through different marketing arrange-
ments DFA sells whey and cheese products to Canada, 
Mexico,  Europe,  Central  America,  South  America, 
Asia, the Paciﬁc Rim and the Middle East [4]. 
Joint  ventures  are  used  by  the  cooperative  to 
enhance its exporting and import substitution capa-
bilities. One important DFA afﬁliation with a foreign 
company is carried out through Dairy America. DFA 
describes Dairy America as “. . . a federated marketing 
company and an association of seven producer-owned 
dairy cooperatives that work together to supply quality 
dairy products regionally, nationally and internation-
ally [4].” Dairy America is the previously mentioned 
mechanism through which the member cooperatives 
outsource the exporting function for NDM to Fonterra 
of New Zealand. For reasons noted earlier, it is ques-
tionable whether outsourcing the NDM export sales 
function to Fonterra will result in optimal corporate 
learning and optimal returns for DFA members over 
the longer-run. 
DairiConcepts is a joint venture entered into by DFA 
that has contributed to import substitution. It represents 
a joint venture between the former New Zealand Milk 
Products  Key  Ingredients  Group  (later  merged  into 
Fonterra) and the food ingredients division of DFA. 
This joint venture company manufactures and markets 
cheese and dairy ingredients for complex applications 
in the food processing industry. 
In 2002, DFA and Fonterra began producing milk 
protein  concentrate  (MPC)  for  the  U.S.  market  in 
Portales, New Mexico through DairiConcepts. DFA 
reports that the DairiConcepts joint venture initiative 
represents the ﬁrst time that Grade A MPC was pro-
duced in the U.S. This was noteworthy since U.S. MPC 
imports in the early 2000s were large and a source of 
concern for the U.S. dairy industry. Hence, the impor-
tance of this U.S. MPC production effort as a founda-
tion for import substitution. 
A  more  recent  collaboration  involved  Ireland-
based Glanbia to create Southwest Cheese Company 
in Clovis, New Mexico. This is a joint venture among 
Glanbia, DFA, Select Milk Producers, and other dairy 
cooperative members of the Greater Southwest Agency. 
The joint venture is owned 50 percent by Glanbia with 
the balance owned primarily by DFA and Select Milk 
Producers. 
Mr. Gary Hanman, former CEO of DFA described 
the joint venture as follows [13]:
This is an exciting project for all of the dairy farm-
ers  who  market  their  milk  through  the  Greater 
Southwest  Agency.  Through  this  partnership,  we 
are creating an important new market for milk in a 
region of the U.S. where milk production has seen 
rapid growth. DFA is pleased to have joined forces 
with Glanbia—a dairy processor with a reputation 
for developing and operating large scale, efﬁcient 
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Glanbia  described  the  performance  of  Southwest 
Cheese in the U.S as follows [12, p.6]:
Southwest Cheese . . . was commissioned in 2006. 
This plant, which produces cheese and whey pro-
teins, is based in New Mexico and continues to ramp 
up to full capacity, forecast for the second quarter 
of 2007. Southwest Cheese is already producing to 
world class standards and is forecast to perform as 
planned in 2007.
Extrapolating  from  the  Southwest  Cheese  expe-
rience,  a  Glanbia  ofﬁcial  interviewed  by  Babcock 
Institute  personnel  in  2007  speculated  that  South-
west Cheese and other large western cheese plants in 
the U.S. will effectively eliminate medium-size com-
modity cheese plants as viable competitors in the U.S. 
While this comment may exaggerate the future struc-
tural change in U.S. cheese processing, it is notewor-
thy. It suggests that the U.S. cheese processing business 
in a few years will consist of a few large commodity 
cheese plants located near western milk production 
areas and many smaller specialty cheese plants located 
in Wisconsin and elsewhere in the U.S. 
The Southwest Cheese plant in Clovis, New Mex-
ico  can  serve  as  platform  through  which  expanded 
cheese exports will be made in Mexico and in South 
America. 
DFA  will  maintain  important  linkages  to  inter-
national dairy markets in future years. The ﬁrm also 
will continue to be a signiﬁcant exporter of differenti-
ated whey products. Whether it will be a major direct 
exporter or will rely heavily on joint venture arrange-
ments to export the cooperativeʼs other dairy products 
in the future is uncertain. 
Land  O’Lakes.  This  cooperative  was  formed  in 
the Upper Midwestern U.S. more than 80 years ago 
when  the  Minnesota  Cooperative  Creameries Asso-
ciation became Land OʼLakes. Land OʼLakes in 2006 
described its operations, including its domestic and 
foreign sales, as follows [20]:
Land OʼLakes is a national, farmer-owned food and 
agricultural cooperative with annual sales of more 
than $7 billion. Land OʼLakes does business in all 
50 states and more than 50 countries. It is a lead-
ing marketer of a full line of dairy-based consumer, 
food service, and food ingredients products across 
the United States; serves international customers 
with a variety of food and animal feed ingredients; 
and provides farmers and local cooperatives with 
an  extensive  line  of  agricultural  supplies  (feed, 
seed, crop nutrients, and crop protection products) 
and services.
While Land OʼLakes does business in more than 50 
countries, the cooperative does not appear to empha-
size international dairy sales. Rather, the cooperativeʼs 
current emphasis in dairy is on increasing domestic 
sales of value-added dairy products. The ﬁrm is well 
along in this effort in butter and deli cheese—it has a 
number one position in the U.S. in branded butter and 
deli cheese sales [19, p.1]. The cooperativeʼs CEO and 
Board Chair said that they will cultivate progress in 
dairy foods by:
•  Continuing to build brand strength and grow 
valued-added business, and
•  Create a right-sized, strategically located and 
proﬁtable industrial infrastructure. 
The cooperativeʼs focus on increasing value-added 
dairy product sales also was revealed in the ﬁrmʼs deci-
sion to sell its Cheese & Protein International opera-
tions (industrial cheese business) located in Tulare, 
California  to  a  U.S.  subsidiary  of  Canada-based 
Saputo, Inc. for U.S. $216 million in 2007 [21,25]. 
However, Land OʼLakes member-producers will pro-
vide raw milk for the Saputo plant under a milk sup-
ply agreement. In a statement accompanying the sale,   
C. Policinski, CEO of Land OʼLakes said the follow-
ing about the strategic implications of the sale [21]:
This sale represents a very important strategic step 
for our Dairy Foods business, allowing more focus 
on our branded, value-added marketing while pro-
viding a secure long-term milk supply arrangement 
for our membersʼ milk production. This transaction 
is consistent with our commitment to generate value 
for members through branded, value-added market-
ing while maintaining an appropriate investment in 
our manufacturing infrastructure.
The sale of the ﬁrmʼs Tulare industrial cheese plant 
does not mean that Land OʼLakes is exiting from the 
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tive continued to operate cheese manufacturing facili-
ties in Tulare, California (different plant from the one 
sold to Saputo); Orland, California; Melrose, Minne-
sota; Denmark, Wisconsin; and Kiel, Wisconsin, and a 
cheese processing facility in Spencer, Wisconsin. 
The cooperativeʼs strategic emphasis on increasing 
sales of value-added dairy products is not surprising 
given the professional backgrounds of the ﬁrmʼs top 
ofﬁcers, as noted below [22]:
•  C. Policinsky, President and CEO: Prior to 
joining Land OʼLakes, Policinski held senior 
leadership positions at Pillsbury and Kraft-
General Foods.
•  S. Dunphy, Executive VP and Chief Operating 
Ofﬁcer, Dairy Foods, Value-Added: Before 
joining Land OʼLakes, Dunphy held management 
positions with Kellogg, Pillsbury, and Proctor 
and Gamble. 
•  A. Pierson, Executive VP and Chief Operating 
Ofﬁcer, Dairy Foods Industrial: Before joining 
Land OʼLakes, Pierson held senior management 
positions at Pillsbury. 
•  B. Wolﬁsh, VP of Corporate Strategy and 
Business Development. Prior to joining Land 
OʼLakes, Wolﬁsh held executive positions with 
General Mills in the U.S. and General Mills, 
Canada.
The experience of these ofﬁcers with large corpo-
rations such as Kellogg, Pillsbury, Proctor & Gamble, 
Kraft, and General Mills—all of which emphasize pro-
duction and sale of differentiated products—undoubt-
edly serves the cooperative well as it seeks to increase 
sales  of  value-added  dairy  products.  Experience  of 
the ofﬁcers with the multinational companies would 
also help the cooperative if it chooses to expand for-
eign sales of dairy products or increase investments in 
dairy-food businesses located outside the U.S. How-
ever, there is little to suggest that such initiatives will 
be emphasized. 
While  Land  OʼLakes  dairy  product  sales  have 
a domestic focus, the ﬁrm did report that part of its 
strong earnings from dairy sales in 2006 resulted from 
“Dairy proteins with a whey price double that of 2005 
and increased European demand [19, p.4].”
Implications. What is one to make of the strategies 
of the U.S. “Big-5” dairy ﬁrms regarding the U.S. role 
in world dairy markets? The U.S. “Big-5” dairy ﬁrms 
have established a fairly strong domestic orientation 
for their sales, emphasizing value-added dairy prod-
ucts. The emphasis of the “Big-5” on increasing sales 
of value-added dairy products has numerous advan-
tages. Firms selling value-added products do not need 
to compete exclusively on the basis of price. In addi-
tion, producers of value-added dairy products need not 
be large, low-cost producers in order to remain proﬁt-
able over the longer-run. 
However, DFA and Land OʼLakes have established 
a  foundation  of  international  expertise  that  would 
allow them to increase dairy exports and FDI if the 
proﬁt picture changes to strongly favor increased inter-
national sales. DFAʼs involvement with Fonterra and 
Glanbia, for example, undoubtedly gives the coopera-
tive a useful perspective on international dairy markets. 
However, DFAʼs involvement through DairyAmerica 
to outsource sales of NDM to Fonterra prevents the 
cooperative from gaining direct exporting experience 
with a product that has emerged as an important dairy 
export item. 
While Land OʼLakes is focusing on building on its 
strong branded U.S. business in butter and deli cheese 
to increase sales of value-added dairy products, it does 
have  international  sales  in  numerous  countries.  In 
addition, useful cross-fertilization of ideas undoubt-
edly occurs between personnel from the cooperativeʼs 
International Development unit and the dairy group. 
For example, experience that the cooperativeʼs Inter-
national Development arm has gained from contractual 
work for the U.S. Agency for International Develop-
ment undoubtedly helps the ﬁrm to make informed 
FDI  decisions.  Such  experience  would  be  useful  if 
the cooperative focused more heavily on international 
dairy business. 
Kraft Foods and Dean Foods do not appear to be 
increasing the foundation for any substantial expansion 
of their foreign dairy businesses. Indeed, they seem to 
be moving to a greater emphasis on domestic sales or 
foreign sales of non-dairy items in the case of Kraft 
Foods. Kraftʼs purchase of a $7.2 billion foreign bis-
cuit (cookie) business in 2007 speaks volumes about 
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As suggested earlier, Schreiber Foods is a company 
to watch. The ﬁrm appears to be doing many things 
correctly in domestic and foreign markets. It is also 
nimble enough to exit loss-producing businesses rap-
idly. 
The bottom line is that cooperative members of the 
“Big-5” are positioned to expand dairy exports and 
to make investments in foreign dairy-food businesses 
if they see strong proﬁt potential in such businesses. 
Schreiber also has the potential to further expand its 
foreign dairy product sales. 
However, smaller dairy companies may be a main 
engine for expansion of U.S. dairy exports. Davisco of 
Le Sueur, Minnesota represents a noteworthy example 
of such a ﬁrm. Davisco produces some 185 million 
pounds of cheese annually and is one of the largest sup-
pliers of cheese to Kraft Foods [7]. Whey products are 
an important companion product of Daviscoʼs cheese 
business. The company produces 10 million pounds of 
whey protein isolate annually. Davisco indicates that 
it is the industry leader in technology and production 
of whey protein isolates, accounting for 65 percent of 
whey protein isolates sold worldwide. These isolates 
are found in many grocery products today, including 
sports drinks, reduced-fat candies, low-fat salad dress-
ings,  infant  formulas,  yogurts,  shelf-stable  baking 
mixes, and low-fat cheese sauces. Given the diverse 
uses of whey protein isolates, these products are likely 
to represent a source of growing export demand.
FDI Trends Aﬀecting U.S. Dairy-Food Firms
For the next several years at least, U.S. ﬁrms are 
likely to be small players in FDI in dairy-food busi-
nesses. Partly this is because of the decline in the value 
of the U.S. dollar in foreign exchange markets.
The large decline in the value of the U.S. dollar 
relative to the Euro, in particular, has created formi-
dable disincentives for U.S. dairy-food ﬁrms to invest 
in Euro-zone countries. Canadaʼs dairy businesses also 
have become expensive for U.S. ﬁrms since the Cana-
dian dollar reached approximate parity with the U.S. 
dollar in the third quarter of 2007. The U.S. dollar has 
held up well relative to the Mexico peso, making ﬁrms 
in that country potentially more attractive as FDI tar-
gets for U.S. dairy-food companies. 
The limited role of the U.S. in FDI in dairy-food 
businesses is not a new phenomenon. An ERS-USDA 
report issued in 2005 described the situation as follows 
[36]:
The dairy sector, one of the largest food sectors in 
the United States, has been less successful (than 
ﬁrms  involved  in  branded  non-dairy  beverages, 
grain and oil seed milling, etc.) in gaining a foot-
hold overseas, and accounts for 2 percent of U.S. 
FDI in food manufacturing. In fact, investments 
by  foreign  ﬁrms  in  the  U.S.  dairy  sector  have 
exceeded  similar  U.S.  direct  investment  abroad 
(emphasis supplied).
What accounts for the attractiveness of the U.S. as 
a destination for FDI in dairy-food businesses? The 
ERS-USDA  reports  that  three  main  characteristics 
make the U.S. attractive to FDI, alliances and partner-
ships, namely: (a) the sheer size of the high-income 
market, (b) the absence of supply controls on raw milk 
production, and (c) foreign direct investment policies 
of the U.S. government are less restrictive than those 
of other high-income countries [1].
How big is the footprint of FDI in the U.S. dairy-
food industry? The ERS-USDA describes the size and 
nature of FDI in the U.S. dairy-food business as fol-
lows [1, pp.12, 15]:
. . . investments (in the U.S. dairy industry have 
been) steadily growing over the past two decades. 
In 2000, large foreign-owned proprietary ﬁrms had 
U.S. sales of $6.4 billion, accounting for about 3 
percent of U.S. dairy sales. By 2003, the stock of 
foreign direct investment in the U.S. dairy industry 
amounted  to  $2  billion.  Foreign  companies  now 
own $4.6 billion of assets in the U.S. dairy industry. 
Foreign ﬁrms have a signiﬁcant presence in various 
“less tradable” product markets, such as ice cream 
(Unilever), and yogurt (Danone and Sodiaal) . . . 
Nestle also formed a joint venture, Ice Cream Part-
ners, a General Mills subsidiary, which includes 
such popular brands as Haagen-Dazs and Drum 
Stick. Nestle and Unilever, an Anglo-Dutch com-
pany, together account for 30 percent of the U.S. 
supermarket sales of ice cream.
Wisconsin recently has been a recipient of dairy FDI. 
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ture, Trade and Consumer Protection, described recent 
foreign investments in Wisconsinʼs dairy processing 
industry as follows [24]: 
Cheese  producers  from  other  countries  are  also 
interested in locating (in Wisconsin). (As evidence 
he cited) the Kaukauna cheese plant purchased in 
2006 by Arla, a Danish company thatʼs one of the 
worldʼs largest dairy companies and the Woolwich 
Dairy goat-cheese factory being developed in Lan-
caster (Wisconsin) by Canadaʼs largest goat-cheese 
producer.
Foreign  dairy-food  ﬁrms  investing  in  the  U.S. 
have brought important technologies and expertise 
to the U.S. dairy industry. 
The bottom line is that FDI by U.S. dairy com-
panies  in  foreign  dairy-food  businesses  is  likely  to 
remain small for the foreseeable future. Indeed, since 
U.S. companies made little FDI in dairy-food busi-
nesses  outside  the  U.S.  when  the  U.S.  dollar  was 
relatively strong, there is little prospect that those pur-
chases will increase substantially now that the dollar is 
much weaker. Thus, dairy exports—which are helped 
by the weak U.S. dollar—rather than FDI are likely to 
be the mechanism through which the U.S. dairy indus-
try increases its role in world dairy markets in the next 
several years.
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APPENDIX TABLE 2. U.S., Oceania and Europe Butter Prices, 1995–2007.
   US Butter   Oceania   Europe    
   Price  Butter Price  Butter Price                U.S. Price as % of Price  
Year   (U.S.$/mt)   (U.S.$/mt)   (U.S.$/mt)  for Oceania  for Europe
1995   $1,795   $1,991  $2,194   90.2   81.8
1996   2,376  1,696   1,850   140.1   128.4
1997   2,556  1,515   1,842   168.7   138.8
1998   3,899  1,749   1,916   222.9   203.5
1999   2,733  1,345   1,511   203.2   180.9
2000   2,594  1,225   1,371   211.8   189.2
2001   3,666  1,331   1,403   275.4   261.3
2002   2,438  1,044   1,156   233.5   210.9
2003   2,524  1,343   1,411   187.9   178.9
2004   4,005  1,791   1,893   223.6   211.6
2005   3,414  2,131   1,969   160.2   173.4
2006   2,726  1,773   1,912   153.8   142.6
2007*  3,047  2,610   3,580   116.7   85.1
Continues
APPENDIX TABLE 1. U.S. Average Monthly NDM Stock Data, 1996–2006.
Year   Average Monthly   Average Monthly   Government Stocks 
   Total Stocks  Government Stocks   as % of Total 
   (mt)   (mt)
1996   35,108   1,852   5.3
1997   57,180   2,843   5.0
1998   73,691   32,901  44.6
1999   106,576   53,245  50.0
2000   236,025   165,185   70.0
2001   392,058   334,350   85.3
2002   526,290   468,830   89.1
2003   548,845   498,643   90.8
2004   335,775   282,818   84.2
2005   114,220   69,586   60.9
2006   58,888   16,933   28.8
Source: USDA-AMS, Dairy Market Statistics, 1996–2006 [35].
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APPENDIX TABLE 2. Continued
  U.S. Butter  Oceania  Europe    
   Support  Butter  Butter     U.S. Support Price as % 
  Price  Price  Price                  of Price for 
Year   (U.S.$/mt)   (U.S.$/mt)   (U.S.$/mt)   Oceania  Europe
1995   $1,433   $1,991  $2,194   72.0   65.3
1996   1,433  1,696   1,850   84.5   77.5
1997   1,433  1,515   1,842   94.6   77.8
1998   1,433  1,749   1,916   81.9   75.0
1999   1,433  1,345   1,511   106.5   94.8 
2000   1,453  1,225   1,371   118.6   106.0
2001   1,774  1,331   1,403   133.3   126.4 
2002   1,956  1,044   1,156   187.4   169.2
2003   2,315  1,343   1,411   172.4   164.1
2004   2,315  1,791   1,891   129.3   122.3
2005   2,315  2,131   1,969   108.6   117.6
2006   2,315  1,773   1,912   130.6   121.1
2007*  2,315  2,610   3,580   88.7   64.7
Source: Prices obtained from USDA-AMS, Dairy Market Statistics [35]. U.S. market prices for butter are for Chi-
cago Mercantile Exchange Grade AA butter. Oceania and Europe prices are F.O.B. port. 
*Market price ﬁgures for butter 2007 are for ﬁrst nine months of the year. The butter support price is for the full 
year of 2007.